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The Shapash Nuclear Research Institute (SNRI) data book was issued by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2013. The hypothetical facility data book describes the hypothetical site, 
which is divided into two areas: the low-security area, known as the administrative area, and the very 
high-security area, known as the protected area. The book contains detailed descriptions of each 
area’s safety and security measures, along with figures of multiple buildings in both areas, and also 
includes information about the site’s computer networks. 
 
This paper aims to identify security weaknesses related to the institute’s location, the Administrative 
Area (AA), the Protected Area (PA), and the Instrumentation and Control Technology system (ICT) 
within the SNRI and proposes corrective actions to improve the site’s security measures against 
malicious acts, based on the IAEA nuclear security series publications, and ultimately proposes a new 
layout for the whole site and the research reactor building presenting the changes made, using a 
software called Edraw Max. 
I. Introduction 
Nuclear and radioactive materials have been significantly useful for humankind in medicine, 
agriculture, and industry and for helping states with nuclear power plants to produce electricity and 
meet the increased demand of energy supply while having a clean source of energy. Although these 
materials are used for pacific purposes, they could also have devastating consequences should they 
fall into the hands of criminals and terrorist groups. 
 
The IAEA has issued such a data book, the Hypothetical Facility Data Book: The Shapash Nuclear 
Security Research Institute (SNRI), to help member states, experts, and researchers study a 
hypothetical nuclear facility to practice nuclear security measures and as an educational tool in 
tabletop exercises, workshops, and trainings. The data book describes security measures at different 
areas of the facility, with the measures containing vulnerabilities for the reader to discover and learn 
from. 
 
Our research developed out of such a tabletop exercise, for which this article is the result. Our article 
begins with an overview of the SNRI, describing the administrative area, the protected area, and the 
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computer network. We then identify the various weaknesses relating to the site’s location, the 
administrative area, the protected area, and the instrumentation and control system (ICT), and we 
propose corrective measures for each weakness. We conclude by suggesting a new site layout for both 
the overall facility and the research reactor building. 
II. The Shapash Nuclear Research Institute Site 
Overview 
The Shapash Nuclear Research Institute is a hypothetical research institute. It is the “Republic of 
Anshar’s” first nuclear energy research facility. The facility has two major areas: the administrative 
area and the protected area (Fig. 1). 
 
The Administrative Area (AA) is surrounded by a 2.5-meter-high fence. Personnel entering the site 
entrance gate must pass through an access control point where they must present badges and be vetted 
by the guard, who ensures that the badges are valid. The procedure is repeated for off-hour access. 
The personnel phone the guard in the central alarm station (CAS) from a telephone at the gate; 
possession of a valid site badge is the only prerequisite for gaining access. 
 
All buildings within the AA are not alarmed—including the radioactive waste site, classified as 
category III. The waste site is used for the storage of radioactive waste from various buildings, such as 
the research reactor and the fuel fabrication building. The site is under 24-hour surveillance by guards 
on foot patrol. 
 
The security officer verifies the decals and badges of vehicles entering the site before allowing access. 
A delivery vehicle must present shipping documents to be verified and ensure that the vehicle has a 
delivery for the institute, and after a check, the guard makes sure that the recipient is expecting a 
delivery; if correct, the vehicle is searched for contraband. Personnel and vehicles exiting the site are 
not checked in any way. 
 
The Protected Area (PA): The very high-security area contains the research reactor building, the fuel 
fabrication building, support buildings, the oxide storage bunker, the road and rail transportation 
terminus, the main cafeteria, and the shipping and receiving building. The area is surrounded by two 
2.5-meter-high chain-link fences 5 meters apart, with guards towers located at each corner within the 
protected area perimeter. Patrols of the perimeter are carried out by a foot patrol guard on the patrol 
road on a random basis. 
 
To access the PA, personnel must pass through metal and radiation detectors in a contraband search. 
Items in possession are X-rayed, passing through metal detectors. If an individual fails the metal 
detector search, the procedure is repeated. Personnel exiting the PA pass through a radiation portal 
monitor, and if no alarm sounds, they continue through the exit door. 
 
A guard verifies vehicles to ensure that the drivers have badges allowing access to the institute, before 
a gate permits entry. The guard checks the vehicle for contraband, and once the inspection is 
complete, the gate is unlocked, permitting entry of the vehicle to the SNRI-protected area. 
 
The computer network of the facility operates under a system that connects a number of computer 
systems, forming a local area network with protocols which control the passing of information. 
 
The research reactor, the fuel fabrication area, and the central alarm station contain sensitive 
information and, thus, operate on a red network. The server for the administrative network (the yellow 
network), which contains all administrative functions, is located in the administration building. 
Information on the green network, also called the general network, is available to the general public. 
 
The plant’s own telecommunication system is used to provide analog and digital connections, but the 
unavailability of analog spares forces the site to change to digital ICT. Data threats that the SNRI has 
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experienced include hacking attempts, reported by the computer network engineering group, and 
intercepted communications from a neighboring country [1]. 
III. Identification of the SNRI Security Measures’ 
Weaknesses and Proposed Corrective Actions 
In examining the SNRI site, we identified weaknesses relating to the location of the institute, the 
administrative area, the protected area at the level of the fuel fabrication building, the research reactor 
building, the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) organization, contraband detection 
equipment, and the shipping and receiving building and the instrumentation and control system ICT.  
In the tables below, we discuss these weaknesses and propose corrective actions which, we believe, 
can improve access control procedures, the physical protection system of the facility, and information 
security. 
A. Location 
Weaknesses Proposed corrective actions 
1. • The institute is located in the country’s 
capital, which presents crossroads of trading 
lanes;  
   • The city’s inhabitants live in poor conditions 
and resent the institute. 
 
1. • Siting a nuclear facility in a busy city 
increases the probability of malicious acts 
attempts. A suitable site for a nuclear facility 
should be selected prior to designing the facility, 
taking into consideration population distribution 
and other factors that could comprise security 
measures. States with an interest in the 
development of nuclear power projects should 
also take into consideration multiple criteria for 
which consequences of a potential accident 
would be at acceptable limits: 
- The costs are minimized. 
- The site characteristics (population 
distribution, meteorology, hydrology, 
etc.). 
- Low probability of phenomena 
occurring [2]. 
B. Administrative Area 
Weaknesses Proposed corrective actions 
1. The site entrance gate is unlocked and open 
during normal working hours; intrusion could 
occur when guards are absent. 
1.  The site entrance gate should be locked and 
alarmed to prevent and detect any unauthorized 
access and to complete the security personnel job. 
2. Possession of a valid site badge is the only 
requirement for off-hours access, which could 
increase unauthorized access. 
 
2. • Technical means and procedures for access 
control to authenticate an individual’s identity to 
confirm that the name and the personnel 
particulars of the individual in question are 
correct [3]. 
    • For off-hours access, personnel should have 
an authorized slip listing their requisite task, the 
area where the task is to be carried out, and the 
amount of time needed. Security personnel then 
compare the slip’s information with the 
information he/she has been informed of in 
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advance; if the information matches, the 
personnel are escorted to their designated posts. 
3. Administrative area buildings are not alarmed, 
which could assist adversaries in achieving 
malicious acts. 
3. Buildings within the AA should be alarmed so 
as to detect any intrusion. 
4. The radioactive waste site is located within the 
AA, a low-security area; unauthorized removal of 
nuclear material can be carried out by an insider. 
4. The radioactivity waste site shouldn’t be 
located within the AA, but rather, in a higher-
security area. 
5. Vehicles and personnel exiting the AA are not 
checked, making it easy for an insider to leave 
the premises with unauthorized materials or 
having committed malicious acts. 
 
5. • Vehicles, persons, and packages entering and 
exiting the AA should be subject to search for 
detection and prevention of unauthorized access. 
    • Parking area should be located farther from 
both the administrative and protected areas to 
prevent unauthorized access to them. 
6.  Most senior management personnel have keys 
to the outer doors of the administrative buildings, 
and access to multiple zones within the site 
increases the chance of an insider carrying out a 
malicious act. 
6. All employees should only have keys to his/her 
personnel post; even senior management 
personnel could conceivably have malicious 
intentions. 
C. Protected Area 
Weaknesses Proposed corrective actions 
1. Fences surrounding the protected area are only 
2.5 meters high. 
 
1. The protected area should be ringed by two 
parallel fences of a 3-meter (minimum) height 
and topped with strands of barbed wire, the inner 
fence providing a physical barrier to prevent 
unauthorized access and supplemented by 
intrusion detection equipment. The outer fence 
reduces false alarms triggered by people or 
animals [4]. 
2. Patrol inside the perimeter of the protected 
area is conducted by only one guard on foot, 
which is not extensive enough for such a 
sensitive area. 
2. Guards should patrol the protected area at 
scheduled hours, but should also patrol the area 
at unscheduled hours to prevent an adversary’s 
calculations [5]. 
3. Unauthorized access can occur during work 
hours, since access points are always open 
throughout the week. 
3. Identity of authorized persons entering the PA 
should be verified; passes or badges should be 
issued and visibly displayed inside the PA. 
4. The VIP parking area is located inside the 
protected area. 
4. • The parking area—including VIP parking—
should be located far from both the 
administrative and protected areas. 
     • Portal display monitors should be installed in 
conjunction with physical protection systems so 
that portals are properly staffed for surveillance 
and detection [6]. 
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    • To prevent unauthorized vehicles from 
entering the facility, vehicle barriers should be 
placed at a suitable distance from the inner area 
[6]. 
    • Effective physical protection systems 
comprise three axes: 
—Detection: requiring technical means, such as 
intrusion sensing and access control. 
—Delay, using barriers, response forces, and 
distance. 
—Responses which will be driven by 
professional security staff and an off-site law 
enforcement body [3]. 
   • The central alarm station (CAS) should 
always be staffed for monitoring and evaluating 
alarms and should ensure communication 
throughout the facility with the response guards 
[6]. 
    • The central alarm station should be secured 
in such a way that acquired information won’t be 
lost or altered in the event of a threat.  
   • An uninterruptible power supply should be 
provided and protected against unauthorized 
manipulation for the CAS, communication, and 
alarm equipment [6]. 
5. The cafeteria is located the protected area, 
which leads to unauthorized personnel regularly 
entering and exiting the PA. 
5. The cafeteria should not be located within the 
protected area, so as to minimize unauthorized 
access to the area. 
6. The road and rail transportation terminus is 
located within the PA, which is neither secure 
nor safe, even with robust security measures, thus 
placing the entire site in danger. 
6. Security measures for shipping and receiving 
materials should be kept to the shipping and 
receiving building. 
1. Fuel Fabrication and Reactor Building 
Weaknesses Proposed corrective actions 
1. Oxides stored on open shelves in the fuel 
fabrication building, as well as experiment 
materials in room R091 (Fig. 4) in the reactor 
building, can easily be stolen in the event of 
unauthorized access. 
1. Material containers placed on open shelves 
should be caged in order to increase the time 
required for completing malicious acts. 
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Fig. Caged Material 
2. The main entry doors are made of regular 
glass; an offender could easily break in. 
2. Doors should be made of bullet-resistant glass, 
not regular glass. 
3. There are no alarms in the offices or sensors 
on the office doors in off-hours, and an intrusion 
therefore wouldn’t be detected. 
3. Tamper indicating devices (TIDs) should be 
installed on critical cabinets. 
4.  Information showcased in the foyer in the fuel 
fabrication building could help an adversary to 
carry out malicious acts.  
4. Site details shouldn’t be displayed, even for 
visiting dignitaries. 
5. There is no metal or nuclear material detector 
at the emergency exit of fuel fabrication 
building’s administrative area. 
5. Tampering emergency doors should be 
installed at the reactor and fuel fabrication 
buildings. 
6. Room R091 is next to the personnel 
emergency exit door; in the event of emergency, 
unauthorized theft from the room could be 
carried out by an insider. 
6. Separate the emergency door from the 
shipping door to avoid material being removed in 
the event of an emergency. 
7. No CCTV cameras are installed at vital areas 
to record entering and exiting personnel. 
7. • Install CCTV cameras covering the main 
entrance and the reactor shipping/receiving door. 
Install an additional CCTV camera to cover the 
entrance to the fuel fabrication building (Fig. 5). 
   • The live camera should be monitored inside 
vital areas, with the option of recording. 
   • All individuals requiring access to the reactor 
hall should be vetted, including students during 
pedagogical visits from universities—who should 
submit request forms to the national regulator. 
  • Temporary personnel with access to the 
facility, such as visitors or construction workers, 
should be escorted to ensure security [5]. 
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2. NMAC organization 
Weaknesses Proposed corrective actions 
1. • A single individual is assigned the 
responsibility for technical coordination of the 
overall NMAC programs; the individual could 
manipulate the system without being detected. 
   • The measurement control coordinator is the 
only person able to verify the measurement 
equipment; not applying the two-person rule 
would make it difficult to detect manipulation. 
  • The two-person rule is not applied to samples 
of category III, thus increasing the chance of an 





1. • Apply the “two-person rule,” which requires 
that two qualified individuals work together at 
the same time and location at all times. This rule 
provides a high level of security to attractive 
nuclear material and can serve as a means for 
detection [5]. 
   • Account for and control all materials by use 
of an inventory. Any detected inconsistencies 
should be reported to the facility manager 
   • Conduct quality assessments of the NMAC 
system, including normal operation and 
emergency conditions [7]. 
   • Apply the graded approach: as consequences 
increase, a high level of protection is needed [8]. 
   • Raise awareness about nuclear security 
culture through trainings and drills. 
   • Conduct a continuous improvement plan 
process to learn from past incidents. 
2. The SNRI has eight (8) Material Balance 
Areas (MBAs), but all accountable nuclear 
material is maintained in just one of them. 
2. Keep an inventory of all nuclear material at the 
SNRI at each MBA, with each having its own 
Key Measurement Points (KMPs). 
3. Contraband detection equipment 
Weaknesses Proposed corrective actions 
1. • The health physics personnel make any 
required adjustments to equipment, as the 
technical unit does not receive training in nuclear 
detection equipment; the health physics 
personnel could manipulate the detection systems 
for later intrusion. 
• The head of the health physics department locks 
the key to the radiation portal monitor control 
and sensitivity adjustment in a safe in his office; 
the password to the safe could be guessed by the 
unauthorized personnel, gaining access to the 
key. 
1. • Keep records of all personnel with access to 
or possession of keys or systems that control 
access to areas where nuclear material exist [6]. 
    • Train personnel undertaking responsibilities 
of sensitive positions such as radiation control.  
2. If the supervisor code is entered, several basic 
sensitivity programs can be selected with one 
keystroke. 
2. Multiple barriers should be in place, which 
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4. Shipping and receiving facility 
Weaknesses Proposed corrective actions 
1. • Waste packages are transferred to the 
shipping and receiving facility for later transfer 
to the radioactive waste site; in the absence of 
security guards, nuclear material could be 
removed without being detected. 
    • Oxide powders are often left in the shipping 
and receiving facility for two to three hours while 
the receiving paper work is completed; these 
materials are checked by patrol guards every 30 
minutes. Theft of material could occur in the 
interims.  
1. • Materials left at the shipping and receiving 
facility while paperwork is finalized should be 
monitored at all times. 
   • Effective communication between all 
entities with responsibility of assuring secure 
transport (guards, response force, shipper, and 
receiver) should be ensured. 
   • Separate the loading and unloading docks, 
with security guards at each gate (Fig. 3). 
   • The warehouse manager office should be 
located at the shipping and receiving facility to 
monitor operations. 
   • Truckers should be escorted and separated 
from sensitive materials. 
D. ICT Operations and Information Security: 
Weaknesses Proposed corrective actions 
1.• The republic of Anshar’s nuclear regulator 
does not yet have a regulation for information 
and communication technology system; thus, the 
responsibility falls on the plant operator. Not 
having such a policy means that responsibilities 
are not defined, and there is no outline of the 
current requirements, operations, 
interdependencies, risk, and control. 
 
1. • The state should establish a policy for 
information security under its legislative and 
regulatory framework. This consists of outlining 
a definition of information security, roles, and 
responsibilities of all personnel dealing with 
sensitive information and risk management plan 
based on a risk assessment approach conducted 
by the state. 
  • Conduct periodic evaluation of the 
procedures to ensure that they stay up-to-date 
and to remind staff members of the importance 
of adhering to the organization’s policy [9]. 
  • Ensure that goals set by the organization are 
regularly compared to results [9]. 
  • Involve staff members in intellectual and 
physical activities in order to avoid relying on 
automation systems, which can put humans in 
dangerous situations. 
2. • The unavailability of analog spares forces the 
Shapash reactor team to shift toward digital 
information and communication security 
systems, and not having enough training during 
transition from analog to digital would increase 
the likelihood of intrusion into the site’s 
information system. 
2. • The technical unit should undergo training 
during the transition from analog to digital 
systems. 
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3. • The cyber security manager and the system 
administrator are the only personnel with access 
to all networks, making it difficult to detect any 
manipulation. 
3. • Apply the “two-person rule” for sensitive 
positions, such as cyber security management. 
 
4. • The operating group adds and removes users 
and users’ rights on behalf of the responsible 
party in each section, which would give them the 
advantage of manipulating information. 
4. • Only approved and qualified users should 
be allowed to make modifications to the 
systems [10]. 
    • Passwords should be changed frequently, 
and multiple barriers to reaching information 
should be applied. 
    • Modifications and updates to hardware or 
software systems should be made based on an 
administrative procedure. 
5. • Electronics engineers should be hired, but 
because of long-term contracts with present staff, 
no additional employees can be hired; hence, 
external skills have to be contacted, which means 
more unnecessary access to the site. 
5. • Implement a career enhancement policy for 
all employees within the organization, and 
evaluate the current positions’ importance so as 
to have more opportunities for hiring personnel 
with requisite skills. 
    • Prior to employment, potential employees 
should go through identity and background 
checks and generic medical and psychological 
assessments, as well as checks of all declared 
degrees. 
6. • The SNRI have experienced hacking 
attempts reported by the computer engineering 
group.  
6. • Ensure confidentiality, integrity, and 
accessibility so as to protect information from 
disclosure to unauthorized parties, modification, 
and denied access [10]. 
    • The computer security program must 
include a rapid means of responding to 
incidents—describing how to maintain the 
ability to quickly detect and respond to 
computer attacks, mitigate the consequences of 
cyber-attacks, correct exploited vulnerabilities, 
and restore affected systems, networks, and 
equipment [10]. 
    • Sensitive data should be backed up in at 
least three different places. 
    • The classification of computer systems 
should be taken into consideration when 
defining the appropriate level of security to be 
applied. 
   • Improve and enforce strict control over the 
use of media and portable equipment. In the 
case of USB drives, CDs, and laptops being 
used to interface with the facility’s hardware, 
measures should be in place to minimize the 
threat of cyber-attacks, such as: 
9
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           —Minimize the use of devices not 
maintained at the factory. 
           —Use virus detection devices both 
before and after being connected to the 
facility’s equipment. 
           —Implement additional security 
measures for data that comes from sources or 
devices not a part of the facility. 
    • Conduct security audit checks to help 
review the facility security risks. 
    • Raise awareness about the importance of 
maintaining the integrity of information by 
reinforcing the computer security culture [10]. 
7. • All of the facility’s employees have access to 
the operational documents of the nuclear process 
in both physical and digital form; such access to 
sensitive data could facilitate malicious activity 
from the inside. 
7. • Users should only have access to 
information necessary for carrying out their 
individual jobs. 
IV. Alternative Site Layout: 
The changes suggested in the corrective actions above are included in both layouts below. 
 
The areas framed in red are ones modified in the new site layout; areas framed in blue in the new site 
layout are modifications we’ve proposed. 
 
Site Layout: 
• The radioactive waste site is no longer within this area and is replaced by the cafeteria 
originally located in the protected area; unauthorized personnel won’t have access to the 
protective area, and the waste site will be more protected in the PA, a high-security area. 
• The VIP parking area is no longer inside the PA and is separated from both the AA and PA. 
• The access control building is located such that personnel and vehicles entering/exiting the 
site will be inspected. 
• Loading and unloading docks are separated at the shipping and receiving building. 
• Both the outer and inner fences are 3 meters high. 
 
The Research Reactor Building: 
• The emergency exit is separated from the shipping door and covered by a CCTV camera. The 
control room has been added (Fig. 5) with the purpose of controlling material shipped in and 
out of the research reactor building. 
• The nuclear materials placed in room R091 on open shelves are caged; this modification will 
serve as a delay measure in case of unauthorized access to the building. 
10
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The site layout as described in the data book: 
 
  
Figure 1: The Site Layout as Described in the Data Book 
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The new site layout: 
 
  
Figure 2: The New Site Layout 
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The research reactor as described in the data book: 
 
Figure 3: Research Reactor Building Floor Plan 
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The new research reactor building floor plan: 
 
Figure 4: The New Research Reactor Building Floor Plan 
V. Conclusion 
We have used the Hypothetical Facility Data Book: The Shapash Nuclear Security Research Institute 
(SNRI) as an educational tool to put theoretical nuclear security knowledge into practice. We believe 
that working on this data book allows for the development of critical thinking skills that are needed in 
the field of nuclear security. In this paper we identified many different security measures and their 
weaknesses related to the institute’s location, the Administrative Area, the Protected Area, and the 
Instrumentation and Control Technology system within the SNRI. We proposed corrective actions to 
improve the site’s protections against malicious acts, as well as a new layout for the whole site and the 
research reactor building, presenting the changes made using a software called Edraw Max. 
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